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Abstract: This article examines the manner in which ‘macro’ legal analysis can 
potentially assist in overcoming some of the issues that are faced in the understanding 
and development of global environmental governance (GEG). It argues that the analysis 
of law through separate and distinct disciplines such as environmental law, trade law, 
corporate law, and human rights law, results in what this article refers to as ‘micro’ 
legal analysis. As such, it contends that this can have the effect of creating obstacles in 
the development of coherent and effective legal and policy choices related to the 
protection of the environment. It illustrates these arguments with examples of practical 
problems that have arisen from the separation of legal issues in practice and provides 
the theoretical underpinnings, based on the critique of international lawyers, for the 
application of ‘macro’ legal analysis. In other words, it argues for a form of analysis 
that would consider the entire range of relevant legal disciplines in a unitary process. It 
then provides a methodology for the development and application of ‘macro’ legal 
analysis in relation to environmental issues. Finally, it considers the potential that this 
approach could have within the field of GEG and comments on the implications that it 
could have on the way that lawyers are trained in the future. 
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There has long been concern with the progress made in the field of international 
environmental law (IEL)1 and with global environmental governance (GEG) 
generally.2 As the international community examines this progress, there are questions 
relating to the adequacy of the types of legal analyses that are used to understand the 
way that law and governance can affect outcomes for the environment. These questions 
are important, as the form of legal analysis that is carried out is crucial to the process 
of understanding the strengths and weaknesses of existing approaches to law and 
governance and can play a decisive part in the way in which GEG is developed in the 
future. 
 
When considering GEG lawyers are faced with a wide range of issues to contend with. 
Naturally there is considerable focus upon the potential and limitations of IEL. 
However, by the same token, there has been an increased awareness of the effects that 
other areas of law have upon the environment; for example, company law, trade law, 
banking law, investment law, human rights law, and constitutional law can all have 
significant, albeit indirect impacts upon it.3 
 
                                                        
1 D. Bodansky, The Art and Craft of International Environmental Law, (Harvard University Press, 
2011), at p. 35. 
2 F. Biermann, P. Pattberg & F. Zelli, ‘Global Climate Governance Beyond 2012: An Introduction’, in 
F. Biermann, P. Pattberg & F. Zelli (eds.), Global Climate Governance Beyond 2012: – Architecture, 
Agency and Adaptation (Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 1-12, at 11. 
3 See, e.g., K. Tienhaara, The Expropriation of Environmental Governance: Protecting Foreign 
Investors at the Expense of Public Policy (Cambridge University Press, 2009); B. Sjåfell & B. J. 
Richardson (eds), Company Law and Sustainability: Legal Barriers and Opportunities (Cambridge 
University Press, 2014); E. Daly & J. May, Global Environmental Constitutionalism (Cambridge 
University Press, 2014); S.J. Turner, A Substantive Environmental Right: An Examination of the Legal 
Obligations of Decision-Makers Towards the Environment (Kluwer Law International, 2009); D.C. 
Esty, Greening the GATT: Trade, the Environment, and the Future (Institute for International 
Economics, 1994).  
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 At the same time, there has been a renewed focus on the fragmented manner in which 
institutions have developed at the international level and the manner in which they 
sometimes create, or respond to, competing priorities within the international 
community.4 Additionally, the future of existing international institutions that are 
charged with administering or developing environmental law treaties has been 
questioned. For example, the future of the newly founded United Nations 
Environment Assembly (UNEA) raises significant issues related to the role and 
authority that it will ultimately assume. 5  Alongside these considerations, some 
sections of civil society have been active in developing alternative methods of 
governance that include non-legally binding environmental controls, such as 
certification schemes and quality standards.6 
 
This fluid range of what are sometimes disconnected factors, means that it can be 
difficult to define with precision the constituent elements of ‘global environmental 
governance’. Consequently, it can be hard to identify effective and efficient strategies 
for reform. Amongst other challenges, lawyers working in this field face the task of 
creating coherent and balanced strategies for the development of the legal and 
institutional architecture that is required to meet the exigencies of environmental 
governance in the future. However, the diverse range of factors that are integral to GEG, 
as identified above, raises questions about the type of legal examination that has 
sufficient breadth and clarity to produce such strategies.  
 
Accordingly, this article inquires into the type of legal analysis that is required both to 
evaluate existing GEG and to develop coherent strategies for its further development. 
                                                        
4 M. Koskenniemi, The Politics of International Law (Hart, 2011), pp. 334-7. 
 
5 B.H. Desai, International Environmental Governance: Towards UNEPO (Brill-Nijhoff, 2014), p. 18. 
6 J.F. Green, Rethinking Private Authority: Agents and Entrepreneurs in Global Environmental 
Governance (Princeton University Press, 2014), pp. 37-8. 
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It argues that existing approaches to legal analysis within the field tend to correspond 
with the type of legal analysis prevalent in other fields of legal scholarship, which are 
usually characterized by the examination of very specific aspects of law, and which this 
article refers to as ‘micro’ legal analysis. This approach often only provides part of the 
picture where GEG is concerned. This article therefore considers the merits of using 
‘macro’ legal analysis to complement existing approaches, in particular to assist in 
providing a broader, synoptic understanding of the law, institutions and initiatives that 
can be said to constitute GEG. It argues that such an approach would aid in providing 
coherent reform options by taking into account the multifarious ranges of law and 
quasi-legal initiatives that can affect outcomes for the environment. 
 
The article is structured as follows. It prefaces the central analysis with a discussion of 
the use of the terms ‘global environmental governance’, ‘micro’ legal analysis and 
‘macro’ legal analysis. From that foundation it summarizes the ways in which both 
‘state’ and ‘non-state’ actors have generally compartmentalized the component parts of 
GEG, and how this corresponds to the approach that lawyers often adopt in their 
analyses of the issues. As such, it considers the potential negative effects of adopting 
an analysis that does not take into account all of the relevant legal and quasi-legal 
components that can affect the outcomes of GEG. This leads to the central tenet of the 
article, which provides theoretical arguments in support of the development of ‘macro’ 
legal analysis in this context, and outlines a methodology for its use. The article 
concludes by commenting on some of the challenges related to the use of ‘macro’ legal 
analysis in the field of GEG and the potential implications it has for training lawyers in 
the future.  
 
 
2. USE OF TERMINOLOGY 
 
The term ‘global environmental governance’ is extremely widely used and has been co-
opted to serve a variety of purposes. Conversely, the terms ‘macro’ and ‘micro’ legal 
analysis are extremely rarely used within the context of environmental law or GEG. 
This section will consider these terms in turn to clarify their meaning and the manner 
in which they are used in this article. 
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2.1 ‘Global Environmental Governance’ 
 
The term ‘governance’ is thought to be derived from the Greek word kubernan, which 
can be translated to mean ‘pilot’, ‘steer’, or ‘direct’ and which was translated into Latin 
as gubernare.7 Part of the complexity of the term can be inferred from the way in which 
it has been used since the 1990s. For example, it is used in different academic 
disciplines including economics,8 political science,9 business and finance,10 as well as 
law.11 Moreover, it is also used to describe certain forms of regulatory oversight within 
industry; thus the terms ‘corporate’12 and ‘financial’13 governance have become part of 
common parlance within the commercial world. 
 
In the field of environmental protection, the terms ‘environmental governance’ and 
‘global environmental governance’ are used for a variety of purposes, which also leads 
to ambiguity.14 The term ‘global environmental governance’ has been used to describe 
the different regimes of IEL along with the functioning of associated international 
                                                        
7 D. Levi-Faur, ‘From “Big Government” to “Big Governance”?’, in D. Levi-Faur (ed.), The Oxford 
Handbook of Governance (Oxford University Press, 2012), pp. 3-18, at 5. 
8 E.g. S. Park & J.R. Strand (eds), Global Economic Governance and the Development Practices of the 
Multilateral Development Banks (Routledge, 2016); R. Eccleston, The Dynamics of Global Economic 
Governance: The Financial Crisis, the OECD, and the Politics of International Tax Cooperation 
(Edward Elgar, 2014). 
9 E.g. J.P. Voß & R. Freeman (eds) Knowing Governance: The Epistemic Construction of Political 
Order (Palgrave Macmillan, 2015). 
10 E.g. E. Avgouleas, Governance of Global Financial Markets (Cambridge University Press, 2012). 
11 E.g. G. de Búrca, C. Kilpatrick & J. Scott (eds), Critical Legal Perspectives on Global Governance 
(Hart, 2013). 
12 E.g. J. Solomon, Corporate Governance and Accountability (Wiley, 2013). 
13 G.R.D. Underhill & X. Zhang (eds), International Financial Governance Under Stress: Global 
Structures Versus National Imperatives (Cambridge University Press, 2007). 
14 L. Kotzé, Global Environmental Governance: Law and Regulation for the 21st Century (Edward 
Elgar, 2012). 
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institutions including those of the United Nations (UN).15 However, it has also been 
used in a broader sense to encompass the analysis of transnational regimes16 that 
include non-legally binding rules designed by non-state actors alone or in partnership 
with state actors with the purpose of achieving specific standards of environmental 
protection.17  
 
With regard to the review of existing structures, the term ‘global environmental 
governance’ is often used when discussing potential reform of UN institutions.18 As 
such, it has been viewed as a term linked with change and one that can be used by policy 
makers when considering potential solutions for global environmental problems.19 
Levi-Faur states that the concept of ‘governance’ can be approached as a structure, a 
process, a mechanism, a strategy, and possibly in other ways too;20 therefore, it is 
extremely difficult to provide a single definition.21 Additionally, it is now common for 
the rules and institutional arrangements that relate to specific sectors of environmental 
protection to be discussed in terms of ‘governance’. For example, the term ‘governance’ 
                                                        
15 E.g. J.G. Speth & P.M. Haas, Global Environmental Governance (Pearson-Longman, 2006). 
16 P.H. Pattberg, ‘Transnational Environmental Regimes’, in F. Biermann & P. Pattberg (eds), Global 
Environmental Governance Reconsidered (The MIT Press, 2012), pp. 97-122. 
17 G. Winter, ‘Introduction’, in G. Winter (ed.), Multilevel Governance of Global Environmental 
Change: Perspectives from Science, Sociology and the Law, (Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 
12; P.M. Haas, S. Andresen & N. Kanie, ‘Introduction: Pluralistic Actor Configurations and Global 
Environmental Governance: Best and Worst Practices for Improving Environmental Governance’, in 
N. Kanie, S. Andresen & P.M. Haas (eds), Improving Global Environmental Governance: Best 
Practices for Architecture and Agency (Routledge, 2014), pp 1-30. 
18 Desai, n. 5 above, p. 91. 
19 F. Biermann & P. Pattberg, ‘Global Environmental Governance Revisited’, in Biermann & Pattberg 
(eds), n.16 above, pp. 1-24, at 4. 
20 Levi-Faur, n. 7 above, p. 8. 
21 For an extensive analysis of definitional issues see Kotzé, n.14 above. 
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is now commonly prefixed by the words ‘earth’,22 ‘forest’,23 ‘climate’,24 
‘groundwater’,25 ‘fisheries’,26 ‘biodiversity’,27 ‘energy’,28 and ‘ocean’,29 amongst 
others. 
 
This article does not put forward a single definition of GEG but provides an explanation 
of the way that it is used for the purposes of this discussion. As such, it uses the term 
in its broadest sense to embrace three components. Primarily, it refers to the state-
centred systems of national and international law that relate directly to environmental 
protection, that is, ‘environmental law’ and ‘international environmental law’ 
respectively. Secondarily, it refers to those state-centred systems of national and 
international law which are not primarily directed towards the protection of the 
environment but which nonetheless have an impact upon it. Finally, it includes non-
legally binding regulatory initiatives by non-state actors (sometimes in partnership with 
state actors) that develop norms and practices with a view to protecting the 
environment, which individuals, businesses and communities may consider that they 
are obliged to comply with for a variety of reasons. 
                                                        
22 K. Bosselman, Earth Governance: Trusteeship of the Global Commons (Edward Elgar, 2015). 
23 S. Ongolo, ‘On the Banality of Forest Governance Fragmentation: Exploring “Gecko Politics” as a 
Bureaucratic Behaviour in Limited Statehood’ (2015) 53 Forest Policy & Economics, pp.12-20. 
24 H. van Asselt, The Fragmentation of Global Climate Governance (Edward Elgar, 2014). 
25 K.I. Conti & J. Gupta, ‘Protected by Pluralism? Grappling with Multiple Legal Frameworks in 
Groundwater Governance’ (2014) Current Opinion in Environmental Sustainability, pp. 1139-47. 
26 X. Basurto & M. Nenadovic, ‘A Systematic Approach to Studying Fisheries Governance’ (2012) 
3(2) Global Policy, pp. 222–30. 
27 M. Daccache, ‘Questioning Biodiversity Governance through its Articulations’ (2013) 18(1) Science, 
Technology & Society, pp. 51-62. 
28 E.g. R. Leal-Arcas, A. Filis & E.S. Abu Ghosh, International Energy Governance: Selected Legal 
Issues (Edward Elgar, 2014); A. Goldthau & J. Martin Witte (eds), Global Energy Governance: The 
New Rules of the Game (Brookings Institution Press, 2010). 
29 R. Kundis Craig, ‘Ocean Governance for the 21st century: Making Marine Zoning Climate Change 
Adaptable’ (2012) 36(2) Harvard Environmental Law Review, pp. 305-50. 
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2.2. ‘Micro’ and ‘Macro’ Legal Analysis 
 
There have only been scant references to the terms ‘micro’ and ‘macro’ legal (or level) 
analysis within the context of environmental law and GEG. The few references that are 
found tend to be highly context-specific and do not correspond to an overall theory or 
to the type of approach that is discussed in this article. For example, Abraham refers to 
‘macro’ legal analysis within the context of a specific report relating to environmental 
jurisprudence in India.30 Also Fisher, writing in relation to water governance, refers to 
‘macro’ legal systems as the ‘statements of value, objective, outcome, or principles’,31 
on the one hand, and ‘micro’ legal systems, as the ‘standards for individual conduct, 
behaviour or decision-making’,32 on the other. 
 
References to ‘micro’ and ‘macro’ forms of legal analysis appear to be most common 
within comparative legal research. In that context, the comparison of entire legal 
systems (‘macro’ level analysis or ‘macro’ comparison) on the one hand can be 
distinguished from the comparison of aspects of legal systems, such as individual pieces 
of legislation (‘micro’ level analysis or ‘micro’ comparison) on the other.33 The terms 
have also been used within the context of the analysis of legal cultures, where the 
‘micro’ level might refer to a local court or prosecutor’s office and the ‘macro’ level to 
                                                        
30 C.M. Abraham, Environmental Jurisprudence in India (Kluwer Law International, 1999), p. 74. 
31 D.E. Fisher, ‘A Jurisprudential model for Sustainable Water Resources Governance’, in M. Kidd, L. 
Ferris, T. Murombo & A. Iza (eds), Water Security and the Law: Towards Sustainability (Edward 
Elgar, 2014), pp. 139-66, at 139. 
32 Ibid. 
33 M.M. Siems, Comparative Law (Cambridge University Press, 2014), p. 14; P. de Cruz, Comparative 
Law in a Changing World (Routledge-Cavendish, 2007); K. Zweigert & H. Kötz (Translated by T. 
Weir), An Introduction to Comparative Law (Oxford Univesity Press, 1998), p. 4; M.M. Siems, ‘Legal 
Originality’ (2008) 28(1) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, pp. 147-64 at152ff; O. Granstrand (ed.), 
Economics, Law and Intellectual Property: Seeking Strategies for Research, (Springer, 2013), p. 539. 
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common law traditions as applied in different nations.34 Another example relates to 
international investment law, where it has been used to denote the distinction between 
systemic ‘micro’ and ‘macro’ legal cultural issues.35 What is clear, is that these terms 
have helped linguistically to relativize the scope and depth of legal analysis in relation 
to a range of subject matter. As such they have proven to be useful and highly adaptable. 
 
For the comparative legal scholar, ‘macro’ legal analysis often involves discovering 
and analyzing relationships between laws in different jurisdictions.36 However, this 
article uses the term 'macro' legal analysis to describe the process of discovering and 
analyzing the full range of laws, legal institutions and quasi-legal initiatives that have 
an influence upon environmental outcomes, with a view to understanding those 
components in their entirety (see section 4 below). Therefore, in this context a 
distinction exists between types of analysis that focus on individual legal regimes 
(‘micro’ legal analysis) and those which take into account the aggregate of the legal 
and quasi-legal components of GEG (‘macro’ legal analysis). 
 
This article argues that as ‘macro’ legal analysis entails the consideration of a range of 
different areas of law and associated institutions it assists in building a broader 
understanding of the causes of environmental degradation from a legal standpoint. As 
such, it has the potential to place a fresh perspective on some of the ‘root causes’ or 
‘drivers’ of environmental degradation that in themselves are ensconced within legal 
regimes.37 By studying the effect of a range of different legal regimes operating in 
unison it is possible to understand the ways in which they affect, support, or contradict 
each other and in some instances simply cancel each other out. To explain the backdrop 
                                                        
34 D. Nelken, ‘Using the Concept of Legal Culture’ (2004) 29 Australian Journal of Legal Philosophy, 
pp. 1-28, at 3-4. 
35 C.B. Picker, ‘International Investment Law: Some Legal Cultural Insights’, in L.E. Trakman & N. A  
Ranieri (eds), Regionalism in International Investment Law (Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 27-
58, at 33. 
36 C. Enright, Legal Technique (The Federation Press, 2002), p. 347. 
37 Bodansky, n.1 above, p. 10; Stephen J. Turner, A Global Environmental Right (Routledge, 2014), pp. 
67-8. 
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against which this argument must be appreciated, the next section discusses why 
established approaches to our understanding of the law are largely based on ‘micro’ 
legal analyses and how that colours our understanding of GEG and its potential 
development. 
 
 
3. THE COMPARTMENTALIZATION OF LAW AND LEGAL ANALYSIS 
 
This section interrogates the compartmentalization that has occurred within legal 
practice, national law, public international law, IEL and GEG generally. It identifies 
the relationship between legal compartmentalization and legal analysis and questions 
some of the prevailing assumptions in relation to the way that we understand, consider 
and develop legal analysis as an input towards strategies for the future of GEG.  
 
Firstly, at the national level, law is compartmentalized into different categories such as 
property law, corporate law, tax law, constitutional law, and criminal law. This subject-
specific approach is also reflected in the specialized nature of the courts and institutions 
that handle legal issues both in the public and private law arenas. Although there was a 
time when legal practitioners could be expected to have the skills and capacity to deal 
with a wide variety of different types of legal problems,38 the current culture demands 
that they specialize.39 This has proved effective as it allows lawyers to focus on specific 
areas of law to meet the individual needs of their clients. It could be said that Ricardo’s 
theory of comparative advantage is borne out within the legal sector.40  
 
                                                        
38 W.E. Burger, ‘The Special Skills of Advocacy: Are Specialized Training and Certification of 
Advocates Essential to Our System of Justice?’ (1973) 42 Fordham Law Review, pp. 227-42, at 231. 
39 R. Moorhead, ‘Lawyer Specialisation: Managing the Professional Paradox’ (2008) 32(2) Law & 
Policy, pp. 226-59; M.H. Khan & L. Davidson Kahn, ‘Specialization in Criminal Law’ (1977) 41(1) 
Law and Contemporary Problems, pp. 252-92. 
40 D. Ricardo, The Principles of Political Economy and Taxation (Dover Publications, 2004) (originally 
published1817). 
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Secondly, the legal compartmentalization that has occurred at the national level is 
mirrored in public international law. Public international law is not only treated as a 
separate discipline to national law but is made up of numerous compartmentalized sub-
disciplines.41 It has evolved through different institutions being tasked to achieve 
discrete goals relating to aspects of concern to the international community. As 
Jouannet states, these sub-disciplines exist: 
 
to achieve specific economic and social objectives designed to satisfy isolated or restricted 
needs and to accomplish precise material results; so much so that the international legal order 
naturally tends to hive off into subsystems so as to better regulate the specific characteristics of 
the various social and economic activities that are now ascribed to it.42 
 
Examples of these subsystems include the World Trade Organization (WTO) with the 
objective of developing ‘free trade’, the United Nations Environment Programme 
(UNEP) and the UNEA charged with the coordination of the work of the international 
community in relation to the environment, and the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP) which primarily has the objective of assisting with the 
coordination of social and economic development of developing countries. As each of 
these branches of international governance has developed its own specific objectives 
and sub-sets of international law, commentators have made the point that this 
sometimes leads to competing priorities between international institutions.43  
                                                        
41 E. Jouannet (Translated by C. Sutcliffe), The Liberal-Welfarist Law of Nations: A History of 
International Law (Cambridge University Press, 2012), p. 264. 
42 Ibid. 
43 International Law Commission (ILC), Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from 
the Diversification and Expansion of International Law - Report of the Study Group of the 
International Law Commission, Finalized by Martti Koskenniemi, UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.682 (13 Apr. 
2006); Koskenniemi, n. 4 above, pp. 334-7; C.P. Carlane, ‘Good Climate Governance: Only a 
Fragmented System of International Law Away?’ (2008) 30(4) Law & Policy, pp. 450-80, at 457; D. 
Shelton, ‘Legitimate and Necessary: Adjudicating Human Rights Violations Related to Activities 
Causing Environmental Harm or Risk’ (2015) 6(2) Journal of Human Rights and the Environment, pp. 
139-55. 
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A good example of the manner in which this can impact GEG is found in the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).44 It includes provisions designed to 
discourage protectionism through trade barriers. Potentially, environmental laws can 
amount to trade barriers and therefore under the GATT, states are required to ensure 
that any environmental measures do not fall foul of the ‘trade disciplines’.45 However, 
whilst the GATT is designed to achieve the objective of trade liberalization, it has not 
been designed to concurrently ensure that specific environmental standards are 
achieved and maintained by its members. In his 1994 book Greening the GATT, Daniel 
Esty made the observation that:  
 
[f]undamentally, the GATT is asymmetrical; its rules only permit a decision that particular 
environmental standards ‘excessively’ intrude on trade prerogatives. The GATT provides no 
comparable process for declaring a nation’s economic activities (and related trade) to be 
environmentally ‘inadequate’ – and therefore an unfair basis for trade. Thus, the GATT fails to 
satisfactorily accommodate environmental protection in defining the ground rules for trade.46 
 
Whilst clearly efforts have been made by the WTO to take environmental issues into 
account over the last two decades, the overall objectives of the regime have not changed 
and this has fuelled continued concern.47 
 
Similarly, within the field of international investment law, agreements that relate inter 
alia to taxes and royalty payments or labour legislation, and which can encompass 
provisions related to environmental regulation,48 have led to concerns that they 
prioritize the interests of investors over those of host states or environmental 
                                                        
44 Marrakesh (Morocco), 15 Apr. 1994, in force 1 Jan. 1995, available at: 
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/06-gatt_e.htm. 
45 A. Palmer, B. Chaytor & J. Werksman, ‘Interactions between the World Trade Organization and 
International Environmental Regimes’, in, S. Oberthür & T. Ghering (eds), Institutional Interaction in 
Global Environmental Governance: Synergy and Conflict among International and EU Policies, (The 
MIT Press, 2006), pp. 181-204. 
46 Esty, n.3 above. p. 140. 
47 D.C. Esty, ‘Free Trade and Environmental Protection’, in R.S. Axelrod & S.D. VanDeveer (eds), The 
Global Environment: Institutions, Law and Policy, 4th Ed (Sage/CQ Press, 2015), pp. 330-49, at 344. 
48 Tienhaara, n.3 above, p. 102. 
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protection.49 This is arguably symptomatic of the ‘competition’ of priorities built into 
the architecture of existing international law and GEG. As Gupta put it, ‘[t]he 
incoherence in the policy world reflects the conflicting visions, paradigms, norms and 
policy instruments chosen by society to deal with specific problems.’50 
 
Thirdly, the compartmentalization which is sometimes known as ‘fragmentation’, that 
is evident within public international law as a whole, also exists within the different 
subsets of international law and is clearly evident within IEL. It manifests itself in the 
large number of individual IEL treaty regimes and has led to concern over ‘treaty 
congestion’.51 In addition, individual treaty regimes can overlap or conflict not only 
with each other but also with other branches of public international law.52 For example, 
the International Treaty on Plant and Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture 
(ITPGRFA),53 the Convention on Biological diversity (CBD),54 and the WTO 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS)55 contain 
a number of overlapping and inconsistent provisions related to the intellectual property 
rights associated with genetic resources.56 This situation can create concern, confusion 
                                                        
49 Ibid., p. 268. 
50 J. Gupta, The History of Global Climate Governance (Cambridge University Press, 2014), p. 207. 
51 D.K. Anton, ‘“Treaty Congestion” in Contemporary International Environmental Law’, in S. Alam, 
M.J.H. Bhuiyan, T.M.R. Chowdhury & E.J. Techera (eds), Routledge Handbook of International 
Environmental Law (Routledge, 2015), pp. 651-66. 
52 R. Wolfrum & N. Matz, Conflicts in International Environmental Law (Springer, 2003), p. 7. 
53 International Treaty on Plant and Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture (Rome), 3 November 
2001, in force 29 June 2004, available at: http://www.planttreaty.org/content/texts-treaty-official-
versions . 
54 Rio de Janeiro (Brazil), 5 June 1992, in force 29 Dec. 1993, available at: http://www.cbd.int. 
55 Marrakesh (Morocco), 15 Apr. 1994, in force 1 Jan. 1995, available at: 
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/27-trips.pdf. 
56 See R. Andersen, Governing Agrobiodiversity: Plant Genetics and Developing Countries (Ashgate, 
2013); G.K. Rosendal, ‘The Convention on Biological Diversity: Tensions with the WTO TRIPS 
Agreement over Access to Genetic Resources and the Sharing of Benefits’, in S. Oberthür  & T. 
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and uncertainty, quite apart from a counterproductive duplication of effort and attrition 
between institutions.57 
 
It must be noted that as a result of some of the negative manifestations of the 
compartmentalized nature of public international law and its associated institutions, the 
term ‘fragmentation’ is frequently used pejoratively. However, in recent years, a 
growing corpus of academics and practitioners have argued that ‘fragmentation’ within 
public international law should not necessarily be regarded in a negative way.58 It 
certainly can be argued that problems related to fragmentation within public 
international law are not completely intractable as, the Vienna Convention on the Law 
                                                        
Ghering (eds), Institutional Interaction in Global Environmental Governance: Synergy and Conflict 
among International and EU Policies (The MIT Press, 2006), pp. 79-102; B.J. Condon & T. Sinha, The 
Role of Climate Change in Global Economic Governance (Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 130-53. 
57 See Andersen, ibid; M. Lightbourne, ‘The FAO Multilateral System for Plant Genetic Resources for 
Food and Agriculture’ (2009) 30 Washington University Journal of Law and Policy, pp. 465-507 at 
466; U. Beyerlin & T. Marauhn, International Environmental Law (Hart, 2011), pp. 198-9. 
58 M. Andenas & E. Bjorge, ‘Introduction: From Fragmenation to Convergence in International Law’, 
in M. Andenas & E. Bjorge (eds), A Farewell to Fragmentation: Reassertion and Convergence in 
International Law (Cambridge University Press, 2015), pp. 1-36, at 2; J. Crawford, Chance, Order, 
Change: The Course of International Law – General Course on International Law, (The Hague 
Academy of International Law, 2014), p. 289; C. Greenwood, Unity and Diversity in International 
Law, in Andenas & Bjorge (eds), n. 58 above pp. 37-55; F. Biermann, Earth System Governance: 
World Politics in the Anthropocene (The MIT Press, 2014), pp. 89-92; L.J. Kotzé, ‘Fragmentation 
Revisited in the Context of Global Environmental Law and Governance’ (2014) 131 South African Law 
Journal, pp. 548-82. 
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of Treaties (VCLT)59 can assist, a certain degree of convergence may take place,60 and 
also there is the potential for overlap management.61  
 
Having said this, it is not the purpose of this article to provide an assessment of the 
fragmented nature of public international law and its institutions. Fragmentation within 
public international law here simply serves as an example of the compartmentalized 
nature of the wide variety of legal and institutional components that ultimately make 
up GEG.  
 
Instead, the key premise of this article is that legal compartmentalization is reflected in 
the way lawyers traditionally conduct their legal analysis. Predominantly, legal work 
focuses on discrete disciplines such as property law, corporate law, criminal law, public 
international law or specific branches and subsets of international law.62 At both the 
national and international levels it can be observed that there is a general trend for legal 
analysis to be compartmentalized in manner which corresponds to the way that the law 
functions in practice. This has led, as a matter of course, to ‘micro’ legal analysis, as it 
requires academic lawyers to specialize in and analyze individual disciplines or sub-
disciplines.63 Consequently, research that cuts across and includes aspects of a wide 
                                                        
59 Vienna (Austria), 23 May 1969, in force 27 Jan 1980, available at: 
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/1_1_1969.pdf. 
60 Andenas & Bjorge, n. 58 above, p. 2. 
61 S. Jinnah, Post-Treaty Politics: Secretariat Influence in Global Environmental Governance (The 
MIT Press, 2014), p. 5; K. O’Neill, ‘Architects, Agitators and Entrepreneurs: International and 
Nongovernmental Organizations in Global Environmental Politics’, in Axelrod & VanDeveer (eds), n. 
47 above, pp. 26-52, at 33. 
62 See J.R. Macey, ‘Legal Scholarship: A Corporate Scholar’s Perspective’ (2004) 41 San Diego Law 
Review, pp. 1759-74; G. Calbresi, ‘An Introduction to Legal Thought: Four Approaches to Law and to 
the Allocation of Body Parts’ (2003) 55 Stanford Law Review, pp. 2113-51. 
63 B. Preston, ‘Benefits of Judicial Specialisation in Environmental Law: The Land and Environmental 
Court of New South Wales as a Case Study’ (2012) 29(2) Pace Environmental Law Review, pp. 396-
440. 
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variety of different legal disciplines in a coherent and integrated manner, is inevitably 
less common. This has an effect on the way that GEG is analyzed; lawyers will naturally 
tend to approach the subject through the lens of a compartmentalized area of expertise 
rather than taking into account the full range of component legal disciplines that it is 
comprised of.  
 
4. NON-STATE ACTORS AND THE COMPARTMENTALIZATION OF 
LAW AND LEGAL ANALYSIS 
 
It is at this juncture that non-state actors will be considered, owing to the important role 
that they undertake in the development of GEG and the relationship that this has with 
associated legal analysis. In this context, the term ‘non-state actors’ will refer to 
corporations and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Their involvement with 
GEG includes the following broad categories: ‘governance’ roles in the protection of 
the environment (sometimes referred to as ‘delegated authority’64),  influencing the 
development of IEL,65 and developing non-legally binding environmental standards 
sometimes referred to as ‘non-state market driven’ (NSMD) initiatives66 that are often 
said to fall under the more general heading of ‘transnational environmental regimes’.67 
These different types of interaction have not developed in a coordinated manner and 
                                                        
64 See, e.g., Green, n. 6 above, p. 7. 
65 M.A. Drumbl, ‘Actors and Law-Making in International Environmental Law’, in M. Fitzmaurice, D. 
M. Ong & P. Merkouris (eds), Research Handbook on International Environmental Law (Edward 
Elgar, 2010), pp. 3-25, at 11-4. 
66  G. Auld, C. Balboa, S. Bernstein & B. Cashore, ‘The Emergence of Non-State Market-Driven 
(NSMD) Global Environmental Governance: A Cross-Sectoral Assessment’, in M.A. Delmas & O.R. 
Young, Governance for the Environment: New Perspectives (Cambridge University Press, 2009), pp. 
183-218, at. 189. 
67 E.g. Pattberg, n. 16 above; P.H. Pattberg & F. Zelli, Encyclopedia of Global Environmental 
Governance and Politics (Edward Elgar, 2015); H. Bulkeley, L.B. Andonova, M.M. Betsill, D. 
Compagnon, T. Hale, M.J. Hoffmann, P. Newell, M. Patterson, C. Roger & S.D. Vandeveer, 
Transnational Climate Change Governance (Cambridge University Press, 2014), p. 1. 
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are not always easily classified; as such the distinctions between them are often blurred. 
It can also be noted that the roles of non-state actors within GEG is heavily debated 
owing to the question of whether their involvement supports or undermines the roles 
and authority of state actors.68 
 
The primary focus in this section is to consider the main characteristics of the three 
above-mentioned  categories of involvement with GEG with  a view to understanding 
the extent to which they  correspond with the compartmentalization of environmental 
law and its associated institutions in practice. Therefore it considers whether the actions 
and initiatives of non-state actors within these categories support and reinforce that 
compartmentalization of the law or whether they operate in a manner that looks further  
by taking into account other law which does not relate to the environment but which 
ultimately has an impact upon it. It then considers the relationship that these forms of 
involvement with GEG have with the types of legal analysis that this article is 
concerned with. 
 
The first category relates to those initiatives in which NGOs are prompted directly or 
indirectly by governments to undertake specific governance roles. It must be borne in 
mind that for centuries monarchs had granted charters to non-state organizations to 
carry out a variety of different purposes.69 This tendency has continued in the field of 
environmental protection and other areas of governance. For example the Royal Society 
for the Protection of Birds (RSPB)70 is an NGO that developed in the 19th century in 
Britain and which regularly assists the UK government with specialized knowledge and 
research.71  Also  the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), 
                                                        
68 Green, n. 6 above, p. 163; R. Falkner, ‘Private Environmental Governance and International 
Relations: Exploring the Links’ (2003) 3(2) Global Environmental Politics, pp. 72-87. 
69 See C. T. Carr, C. T. (ed.), Select Charters of Trading Companies AD 1530-1707. (London: Selden 
Society, 1913) at p. xi. 
70 The Royal Society of Protection of Birds, available at: http://www.rspb.org.uk . 
71 See for example Churchyard, T., Eaton, M., Hall, J., Millet, J., Farr, A., Cuthbert, R. and Stringer, C. 
‘The UK’s Wildlife Overseas: A Stocktake of Nature in our Overseas Territories’ (2014, Sandy, 
Bedfordshire: RSPB) 
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the branch of the US government that works in providing civilian aid in foreign 
countries, has a policy of working with and through NGOs.72 Another example is 
TRAFFIC,73 which is mandated to produce a comprehensive analytical report of the 
Elephant Trade Information System (ETIS) data for the CITES Secretariat.74 What must 
be borne in mind however is that it is sometimes the lack of impetus from governments 
rather than their leadership that provoke NGOs to take on such tasks. For example, the 
underfunding of international organizations such as the United Nations Environment 
Programme (UNEP) leaves critical roles that certain NGOs such as the World 
Resources Institute (WRI)75 and Greenpeace76 have looked to fill by carrying out 
functions such as environmental monitoring and policy verification.77  
 
What can be observed for the purpose of this analysis is that where non-state actors fill 
gaps in expertise or undertake specific tasks within specific international environmental 
law regimes, their work corresponds to the compartmentalized nature of those regimes 
and will have a tendency to reinforce them.  
 
The second category relates to those instances in which NGOs and corporate actors 
engage in influencing the processes that develop both hard and soft IEL under the 
auspices of those regimes themselves.78 There are now more opportunities within the 
                                                        
72 See the USAID website, available at: https://www.usaid.gov/partnership-opportunities/ngo . 
73 See TRAFFIC, available at: http://www.traffic.org . 
74 The Convention on Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (Washington) (CITES) 3rd 
Mar. 1972, in force 7 Oct. 1977, 13 ILM 270 (1974) 687.  
75 The World Resources Institute (WRI), available at: http://www.wri.org . 
76 Greenpeace, available at: http://www.greenpeace.org.uk . 
77 P. M. Haas, Epistemic Communities, Constructivism, and Environmental Politics, (Routledge, 2016) 
at p. 222. 
78 See A. Kiss & D. Shelton, A Guide to International Environmental Law (Martinus Nijhoff, 2007), p. 
66; Drumbl, n. 65 above; J. McCormick, ‘The Role of Environmental NGOs in International Regimes’, 
in Axelrod & Vandeveer (eds), n. 47 above, pp. 92-110.  
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provisions of IEL for non-state actors to engage. This was called for in Agenda 21,79 
but is found to be formally enshrined in numerous treaties, including the 1992 
Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic 
(OSPAR Convention),80 the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC),81 and the 1998 United Nations Economic Commission for Europe 
(UNECE) Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-
making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters (Aarhus Convention).82 More 
than ever before, environmental and human rights NGOs combine significant 
professional expertise with stronger financial backing. Along with more economically 
powerful corporations, they engage in the processes of law and norm creation on the 
international stage through lobbying, agenda-setting and petitioning.83 
 
In this category too, it can be observed that where non-state actors become involved, 
within the permitted opportunities that are provided for by specific regimes they tend 
to reinforce the existing compartmentalization of IEL as they are inevitably operating 
within the confines of those regimes. 
 
The third category of involvement relates to non-state actor initiatives to develop non-
legally binding environmental standards with a view to influencing the conduct of 
                                                        
79 Section III of Agenda 21 provides for the strengthening role of major groups, see United Nations 
Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro (Brazil), 3-14 June 1992, UNCED 
Report, A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1 (vol. I) (1993), available at: 
https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/Agenda21.pdf.  
80 Paris (France), 22 Sept. 1992, in force 25 Mar. 1998, available at: http://www.ospar.org; Art. 11(1). 
81  New York, NY (US), 9 May 1992, in force 21 Mar. 1994, available at: http://unfccc.int; Art. 7(6). 
82   Aarhus (Denmark), 25 June 1998, in force 30 Oct. 2001, 2161 UNTS 447, available at:   
http://www.unece.org/env/pp/welcome.html; Art. 10(5). 
83 Drumbl, n. 65 above, pp. 11-4. However, it must be acknowledged that both corporations and NGOs 
can and often do also influence decision-making that affects the environment through non-formal 
means. 
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businesses, consumers and at times governments themselves.84 These can involve 
corporate actors, NGOs or the two working in tandem on NSMD initiatives. Examples 
include: the standards of the AccountAbility 1000 standards,85 the standards developed 
by the International Organization for Standardization (ISO),86 the certification system 
of the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC),87 the Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP),88 the 
Global Reporting Initiative (GRI),89 and Walmart’s Sustainability Index.90 
 
These approaches represent ad hoc ‘governance from below’ responses, which are 
gaining considerable momentum, but which are regarded by some as ‘too timid a 
remedy’91 for global challenges that may require robust and orchestrated responses 
from the majority of states. However, regardless of their overall potential for impact, 
NSMD initiatives represent a particular type of leadership, which is pertinent to the 
development of ‘macro’ legal analysis within scholarship relating to GEG.  This is 
because some of the NSMD schemes show an understanding that encompasses not only 
the failings of environmental law but also the importance of other legal disciplines, 
such as trade law and corporate law, to environmental outcomes. For example, the FSC 
certification scheme recognizes that the absence of trade law that would halt trade in 
certain types of timber and responds with measures that de facto create trade rules for 
                                                        
84 See Green, n. 6 above, p. 7; see also B.J. Richardson, ‘Socially Responsible Investing for 
Sustainability: Overcoming its Incomplete and Conflicting Rationales’ (2013) 2(2) Transnational 
Environmental Law, pp. 311-38, at 316. 
85 Available at: http://www.accountability.org/about-us/index.html.  
86 Available at: http://www.iso.org/iso/home.html.  
87 Available at: https://ic.fsc.org. 
88 Available at: https://www.cdp.net. 
89 Available at: https://www.globalreporting.org. 
90 Available at: http://corporate.walmart.com/article/sustainability-index.  
91 M.C. Lemos & A. Agrawal, ‘Environmental Governance and Political Science’, in Delmas & Young 
(eds), n. 66 above, p. 83. 
21 
 
participants of the scheme.92 Similarly, it can be argued that the GRI accounting 
standards for corporations respond to limitations within corporate law relating to 
national accounting standards and require participants to produce sets of 
comprehensive environmental accounts.93 
 
In the cases of both the FSC certification scheme and the GRI accounting standards, 
the initiatives look beyond an approach that corresponds with a simple ‘micro’ legal 
analysis of the environmental law to consider the root causes within other areas of law 
that are directly associated with the specific harms to the environment concerned. 
Whilst the approaches of the FSC and the GRI cannot be said to amount to the type of 
‘macro’ legal analysis that this article puts forward, they could be regarded as 
precursors to that type of approach. 
 
It is clear that non-state actors play vital roles in the development of GEG. However, 
much of their activity takes place within the compartmentalized components of GEG 
and as such they often reinforce that compartmentalization through their practices and 
through the ‘micro’ legal analysis that they undertake to engage in those processes. By 
the same token, there are important exceptions to this, such as certain NSMD schemes 
which arguably play an important role in leading the international community towards 
cross-cutting approaches to legal analysis and which bear some of the characteristics of 
the type of ‘macro’ legal analysis this article advocates. 
 
 
5. THEORETICAL ARGUMENTS RELATING TO THE USE OF 
‘MACRO’ LEGAL ANALYSIS. 
 
Having discussed the compartmentalized nature of both the law itself and legal analysis 
related to the constituent elements of GEG, it is necessary to consider the type of legal 
                                                        
92 G. Auld, Constructing Private Governance: The Rise and Evolution of Forest, Coffee, and Fisheries 
Certification, (Yale University Press, 2014), p. 2; B. Cashore, G. Auld & D. Newsom, Governing 
Through Markets: Forest Certification and the Emergence of Non-State Authority (Yale University 
Press, 2004). 
93 See GRI n. 89 above. 
22 
 
analysis that would assist lawyers and policy makers in developing better informed 
strategies for GEG in the future. This section reviews theoretical arguments for renewed 
approaches to legal analysis and the development of GEG.  These arguments assist in 
developing a set of criteria for the design of ‘macro’ legal analysis that could enhance 
our understanding and development of GEG. 
 
The first critique relates to the exclusionary nature of contemporary public international 
law. For decades, some international lawyers have complained that international law 
creates a system of governance that addresses states without directly addressing the 
range of other actors that are involved in decision-making and who may influence 
decisions and outcomes in the international sphere. For example, in 1989, Sands 
commented on the traditional form of public international law by stating that:  
 
[t]he traditional model poses two fundamental problems. First, states have generally proved 
unwilling to exercise their right of "guardian-ship" over the global environment. Second, the 
notion of sovereignty which underlies the current regime poses insurmountable obstacles when 
the problems to be addressed are transnational in scope.94  
 
In the same article he later asserted that:  
[u]ntil international law moves away from the view that international society comprises a 
community of states, and comes to encompass the persons (both legal and natural) within those 
states, it will not be able to provide even the most elementary framework for the protection of 
the environment.95 
 
A reading of that analysis today possibly belies certain achievements in the protection 
of the environment that have been made possible as a result of the existing system of 
international law. However, the fact that the international community, with its 
continued reliance on a state-centred form of international law, still struggles to 
effectively address the impact that non-state as well as state actors have upon the 
                                                        
94 P. Sands, ‘The Environment, Community and International Law’ (1989) 30(2) Harvard International 
Law Journal, pp. 393-420, at 399. 
95 Ibid., p. 393. 
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environment is a testament to its continued validity.96 As such, it can be argued that if 
the international community is to develop a system of law at the international level that 
responds directly to the rights, duties and responsibilities of both state and non-state 
actors, a form of ‘macro’ legal analysis that takes into account all relevant law and 
quasi-legal rules could greatly assist. 
 
Second, there is increasing interest in the multifaceted manner in which solutions to 
environmental issues can be found. These include not only the direct measures that 
states implement in terms of conservation and pollution control, but in addressing a 
range of ancillary laws and rules that do not have the appearance of being directly 
related to the environment, but which can ultimately act as the ‘drivers’ and ‘root 
causes’ of environmental degradation. For example, Daniel Bodansky states that: 
 
[i]f international environmental law is to address not merely the surface manifestations but the 
root causes of environmental degradation, then our understanding of what constitutes an 
environmental issue must grow to encompass economic, social, and trade policy. Indeed, if, as 
some claim, everything is interconnected, then everything becomes an environmental problem. 
For now, however, this kind of integration is still more of an aspiration than a reality.97 
 
Whilst Bodansky still recognizes the ‘considerable sense’ in treating IEL as a discrete 
field of study,98 the admission that it frequently focuses on the symptoms of 
environmental degradation as opposed to the ‘root causes’, indicates a need to pursue a 
wider approach. This suggests that we need a type of legal analysis broad enough in 
scope but incisive enough in method to identify and highlight the underlying causes of 
environmental degradation within the global legal architecture, and then to assess them 
in their entirety. 
 
                                                        
96 E.g. B.J. Richardson & B. Sjåfell, ‘Capitalism, the Sustainability Crisis, and the Limitations of 
Current Business Governance’, in B.J. Richardson & B. Sjåfell, n. 3 above, pp. 1-34 at 18-9. 
97 Bodansky, n. 1 above, p. 11.  
98 Ibid. 
24 
 
Third, there has been considerable focus on the issue of ‘fragmentation’ in international 
law,99 both academically and institutionally.100 In response, Koskenniemi has suggested 
that the international community is bound by regimes which are often at odds or even 
competing with each other. He states that what is required is ‘cosmopolitanism’, which 
he describes as:  
 
a professional sensibility that feels at home in all regimes, yet is imprisoned in none of them. 
This would be what cosmopolitanism can be today: the ability to break out and connect, 
participate in the politics of regime definition by narrating regimes anew, giving voice to those 
not represented in the regime’s institutions.101 
 
It can be argued that to achieve the type of ‘cosmopolitanism’ that Koskenniemi 
suggests, a specific type of analysis combined with a corresponding form of training 
that encompasses the diversity of regimes, would need to be developed. 'Macro’ legal 
analysis could assist in achieving this as it could lead to a professional sensibility that 
takes into account all relevant legal and quasi-legal regimes. Additionally, in the short 
term 'macro' legal analysis could assist in generating strategies to resolve some of the 
current challenges of fragmentation in international law. 
 
Fourth, the comments made in this section relating to the type of legal analysis needed 
to assist in the development of effective strategies for GEG have some clear parallels 
with the concern raised by Fisher et al., that legal scholarship relating to environmental 
law commonly disregards a wide range of factors, both legal and non-legal, that 
ultimately affect it.102 They stress that, notwithstanding the methodological challenges 
                                                        
99 M. Andenas & E. Bjorge, in Andenas & Bjorge (eds) n. 58 above, p. 2.; ILC, n. 43 above,. 
100 M.A. Young, Trading Fish, Saving Fish: The Interaction between Regimes in International Law, 
(Cambridge University Press, 2012), pp. 8-16; Carlane, n. 43 above, pp. 456-62; J. Pauwelyn, Conflict 
of Norms in Public International Law: How WTO Law Relates to Other Rules of International Law 
(Cambridge University Press, 2003). 
101 Koskenniemi, n. 4 above, p. 360. 
102 E. Fisher, B. Lange, E. Scotford & C. Carlane, ‘Maturity and Methodology: Starting a Debate about 
Environmental Law Scholarship’ (2009) 21(2) Journal of Environmental Law, pp. 213-50; see also J.M 
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involved, the failure to include relevant factors within legal scholarship can lead to 
‘intellectual blind spots’.103  Whilst their analysis focuses on scholarship in the field of 
environmental law and not legal analysis relating to the understanding and development 
of GEG per se, there are clear overlaps with the argument developed in this article. 
 
Therefore, it is argued that a carefully designed form of ‘macro’ legal analysis could 
assist in addressing some of the problems within the development of GEG that have 
been identified through key theoretical arguments of recent years. As such it would 
have the potential to contribute to the process of identifying solutions that overcome 
the dysfunctions within the existing forms of GEG and assist in laying the foundations 
for coherently designed reform options. 
 
Finally, the approach of seeking to incorporate all relevant factors within an overall 
analysis also has significant parallels with the approach adopted by the Earth System 
Governance Project, based in Lund (Sweden).104 The Earth System Governance Project 
has brought many experts together to focus on five particular analytical problems 
concerned with GEG. These are: the overall architecture of earth system governance; 
agency beyond the state and of the state; the adaptiveness of governance mechanisms 
and processes as well as their accountability and legitimacy; and modes of allocation 
and access in earth system governance.105 
 
What is important for the purposes of this discussion is that the Earth System 
Governance Project tackles GEG from a perspective that stresses the importance of 
                                                        
Balkin, ‘Understanding Legal Understanding: The Legal Subject and the Problem of Legal Coherence’ 
(1993) 103 The Yale Law Journal, pp. 105-76, at 138; O. Pedersen, ‘Modest pragmatic lessons for a 
diverse and coherent environmental law’ (2013) 33(1) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, pp. 103-131;  
D. Owen & C. Noblet, ‘Interdisciplinary Research and Environmental Law’ (2014) Ecology Law 
Quarterly, pp. 887-938; Gavin Little, ‘Developing environmental law scholarship: going beyond the 
legal space’ (2016) 36(1) Legal Studies, pp. 48-74.  
103 Fisher et al., Ibid, p. 241. 
104 Biermann, n. 58 above. 
105 Ibid. pp. 9-10. 
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including expertise from a range of social sciences in addition to that of natural science. 
As such, it is arguably symptomatic of a move towards analytical frameworks that 
encompass a wide-range of relevant factors in the development of reform 
recommendations. It is argued that the logic of adopting a broad approach to the 
analysis of issues relating to GEG, could be adopted within analysis of the law through 
a carefully designed form of ‘macro’ legal analysis. 
 
6. A METHODOLOGY FOR THE USE OF ‘MACRO’ LEGAL ANALYSIS 
 
In order for ‘macro’ legal analysis to provide a broader understanding and inform the 
future development of GEG, it is suggested that the methodology needs three core 
elements. 
 
The first is that it should encompass the different legal disciplines that are applicable 
to, or have the potential to affect, the aspect of the environment concerned.106 It would 
be necessary to analyze not only national and international environmental law but also 
potentially other areas of law, such as trade, corporate, banking, and tax law. 
Additionally, that analysis would need to take place alongside assessments of the 
associated initiatives by non-state actors, which create governance structures such as 
accountability mechanisms and certification schemes.107 
 
The second is that in addressing the different legal disciplines that are applicable to the 
environmental issue or that have the potential to affect it, the elements of the law that 
are found to comprise the ‘root causes’ or ‘drivers’108 of environmental harm need to 
be properly identified. This may require an analysis that challenges underlying 
                                                        
106 Bodansky, n.1 above, p. 11.  
107 See, e.g., GRI, n. 89 above; Auld, n. 92 above, p. 2; Cashore, Auld & Newsom, n. 92 above; FSC, n. 
98 above; Pattberg, n. 16 above. 
108 Bodansky, n. 1 above, p. 10. 
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assumptions relating to purposes of aspects of the law, and the way that it and its 
associated institutions operate.109 
 
The third is that in considering the reform of law and associated institutions, the 
working relationships between different regimes need to be taken into account so that 
overall efficiencies in terms of cost and administration can be accomplished.110 This 
means that in the process of re-designing legal architecture, there should be both an 
overarching environmental goal that can be integrated within the objectives of all 
institutions and appropriately constructed regimes to ensure that the institutions operate 
in a streamlined manner.111 Increasingly, calls are made for ‘greater attention to cross-
scale issues in efforts to govern the environment’112 and ‘more collaborative forms of 
                                                        
109 Examples could include directors’ duties within the company law of all jurisdictions around the 
globe, see Turner, n. 35 above, pp. 36-50; also aspects of the trade rules under the GATT, see Esty, n. 3 
above, p. 140. 
110 Literature on the re-design of international environmental institutions includes: K. Bosselmann, 
Earth Governance: Trusteeship of the Global Commons (Edward Elgar, 2015) pp. 257-67; Desai, n. 5 
above; Anton, n. 51 above,; N. Goetyn & F. Maes, ‘The Quest for a World Environment Organization: 
Reflections on a Failing Debate and Input for Future Improvement’, in P. Martin, L. Zhiping, Q. 
Tianbao, A.D. Plessis, Y.L. Bouthillier & A. Williams (eds), Environmental Governance and 
Sustainability (Edward Elgar, 2012), pp. 233-247; S. Charnovitz, ‘Towards a World Environment 
Organization: Reflections on a Vital Debate’, in F. Biermann & S. Bauer (eds), A World Environment 
Organization: Solution or Threat to Effective International Environmental Governance? (Ashgate, 
2005), pp. 173-93. 
111 Koskenniemi, n. 4 above, p. 360; Certain authors argue for the establishment of a ‘grundnorm’, or in 
other words a goal that would bind the actions of international environmental actors and institutions. 
See, e.g., R.E. Kim & K. Bosselmann, ‘International Environmental Law in the Anthropocene: 
Towards a Purposive System of Multilateral Environmental Agreements’ (2013) 2(2) Transnational 
Environmental Law, pp. 285-309. 
112 M. C. Lemos & A. Agrawal, ‘Environmental Governance and Political Science’ in Delmas & 
Young (eds), n. 67 above, p. 73. 
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governance’113 that engage effectively with the range of different institutions that can 
have an impact upon environmental governance.114  
 
Taking the aforementioned elements into account, it is suggested that the main 
components of such a methodology should be based on the following stages: 
 
1. An analysis of the desired outcome for the environmental issue concerned, 
based on scientific evidence.115 There is a growing demand for law and policy 
relating to GEG to be aligned with what have become known as ‘planetary 
boundaries’.116 Rockström and colleagues have defined such boundaries in 
relation to climate change, biodiversity loss, the nitrogen cycle, the phosphorous 
cycle, stratospheric ozone depletion, ocean acidification, global freshwater use, 
land use change, atmospheric aerosol loading, and chemical pollution. They 
suggest that if specific thresholds within those spheres are crossed, the results 
could lead to extreme negative consequences for humanity. Some authors also 
refer to these thresholds as ‘earth system boundaries’;117 
 
                                                        
113 Ibid. 
114 Winter, n. 17 above, p. 2. 
115 See Centre for Governance and Sustainability, University of Massachusetts Boston, ‘Summary 
Report – Workshop on International Environmental Governance: Grounding Policy Reform in 
Rigorous Analysis’ (June 27-28, 2011, Bern, Switzerland) 11, available at: 
http://dev.environmentalgovernance.org/wp-
content/uploads/2011/06/12.058_CGS_report_single_v10.pdf ; A. Campbell Keller, ‘Science in 
Environmental Policy: The Politics of Objective Advice’ (The MIT Press, 2009); also P.M. Haas, 
‘Science Policy for Multilateral Environmental Governance’ (Feb. 2012) available at: 
http://www.crcresearch.org/files-crcresearch/File/haas_02.pdf . 
116 J. Rockström, et al., ‘A Safe Operating Space for Humanity’ (2009) 461 Nature, pp. 472-5. 
117 Biermann n. 58 above, p. 32. 
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2. The identification of all legal provisions (whether that be national or 
international) that can have an influence (both positive and negative) on the 
environmental issue concerned;118 
 
3. An overview analysis of all legal aspects (whether that be national or 
international) that can have an influence (both positive and negative) on the 
environmental issue with a view to understanding, inter alia, their rationale and 
the extent to which they contain ‘root causes’ or ‘drivers’ of environmental 
degradation;119 
 
4. An analysis of all non-legally binding governance initiatives relating to the 
environmental issue, such as codes of conduct, eco-labeling schemes, 
certification schemes and corporate reporting schemes. This analysis should 
include an examination of the lacunae or problematical features in the law that 
their existence attempts to redress;120 
 
5. An analysis of the possible legal reforms that would be required to ‘streamline’ 
each of the legal disciplines concerned to ensure that they predispose all of the 
actors involved to the accomplishment of the ‘environmental outcomes’ 
identified in stage 1. This should include the reforms needed to respond 
effectively to the problematical features or lacunae  in the law identified in 
stages 3 and 4 above; 
 
6. An assessment of the steps, including institutional reform, that would be 
required to accomplish the aims in stage 5 over specific timescales. 
 
                                                        
118 Such areas of law may for example include: company law, tax law, investment law, banking law, 
trade law, environmental law and international environmental law. 
119 E.g., if it was clear that company law had an impact, it may be pertinent to analyze the specific 
aspect of corporate law such as ‘directors’ duties’ that was having an effect on the outcome for the 
aspect of the environment concerned. See, e.g., Richardson & Sjåfell, n. 3 above. 
120 E.g., the initiatives of the GRI and FSC. 
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7. CHALLENGES IN THE APPLICATION OF ‘MACRO’ LEGAL 
ANALYSIS 
 
The type of ‘macro’ legal analysis that is proposed here raises numerous challenges.121 
Two of the broader issues will be considered.  These are firstly, the relationship that 
‘macro’ legal analysis should have with ‘micro’ legal analysis; and secondly, the type 
application that it could have to different aspects of GEG. 
 
Both ‘micro’ and ‘macro’ legal analysis have their strengths and weaknesses. As 
‘micro’ legal analysis is required to develop the type of understanding of law that is 
required for legal practice, it has understandably dominated and become deeply 
embedded at all levels.122 However, for research relating to GEG at least, a healthy 
balance should be sought between ‘micro’ and ‘macro’ legal analysis. Naturally, 
‘macro’ legal analysis would not provide the same level of detail as ‘micro’ legal 
analysis, but on the other hand, ‘micro’ legal analysis will inevitably not provide the 
more synoptic insights that ‘macro’ legal analysis could offer. It is therefore argued that 
the two forms of analysis should inform and strengthen each other in a mutually 
reinforcing relationship that ultimately would have the capacity to provide the best 
possible guidance for law and policy makers.  
 
 ‘Macro’ legal analysis could be applied within GEG in numerous ways. If, as some 
assert, international lawyers should see themselves as ‘architects of global 
                                                        
121 E.g., questions for further thought include: How would it be possible to determine what the desired 
outcome for the environment should be, based on scientific evidence? How would this type of analysis 
be linked to other ‘non-legal’ policy considerations in the development of renewed strategies for global 
environmental governance?  
122 C.B. Picker ‘Comparative Law as an Engine of Change for Civil Procedure’, in C.B. Picker & G.I. 
Seidman (eds), The Dynamics of Civil Procedure: Global Trends and Developments (Springer, 2016), 
pp.45-59 at 47. 
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governance’,123 then ‘macro’ legal analysis may assist in equipping them to carry out 
that role. Some contend that the international community is at a crucial juncture in the 
development of GEG. For example, Ivanova states that, ‘[t]today’s debates on 
reforming [GEG] stand at a cross-roads strikingly reminiscent of the one facing the 
system’s original architects in the lead-up to the 1972 Stockholm Conference.’124 It is 
certainly the case that recognition of the need for further reform has been voiced by the 
leadership of UNEP. Achim Steiner, the former Executive Director of UNEP, has 
emphasized the evolving role of the UN and specifically the need for further reforms to 
ensure that UNEP continues to adapt to the challenges that the international community 
faces.125 The type of perspective that ‘macro’ legal analysis provides could possibly 
assist in these processes. 
 
Whilst this article has focused on governance at the global level, ‘macro’ legal analysis 
can also be applied at the project level. It can be used to identify the legal architecture 
that plays a part in the relationships between industrial projects and the environment 
and affected communities. In that context, 'macro' legal analysis might promote an 
examination of a project with regard to, inter alia, property law, the rights of indigenous 
groups, corporate law, banking law, investment law, administrative law, tax law, human 
rights law, as well as environmental law.126  
 
Finally, although ‘macro’ legal analysis could be applied to a wide variety of challenges 
within the field of GEG, it could possibly have particular usefulness in helping to 
address those problems that, in part at least, are exacerbated through the shortcomings 
of extant approaches under the Westphalian system of international law. Climate 
change is representative of that category as it is a particularly complex problem and an 
                                                        
123 K.W. Abbot, ‘Towards a Richer Institutionalism for International Law and Policy’ (2005) 1(1-2) 
Journal of International Law and International Relations, pp. 9-34, at 11. 
124 M. Ivanova, ‘UNEP in Global Environmental Governance: Design, Leadership, Location’ (2010) 
10(1) Global Environmental Politics, pp. 30-59, at 53. 
125 A. White of the Tellus Institute, Interview with Achim Steiner of UNEP (Feb. 2105), available at: 
http://www.greattransition.org/publication/uniting-nations-the-un-at-a-crossroads. 
126 See, e.g., Turner, n. 3 above. 
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extremely difficult challenge for the international community to confront. It is therefore 
possible that ‘macro’ legal analysis could prove to be a useful tool to inform the 
development of the legal and policy approaches that are designed to tackle it. 
 
8. CONCLUSION 
 
This article has sought to make the central argument that ‘macro’ legal analysis can 
assist in our understanding and development of the legal and quasi-legal components 
of GEG. It has made the case that this form of analysis has the potential to provide an 
important perspective and understanding for lawyers and policymakers to draw upon 
in developing reform options. Owing to the broad perspective that it can provide, such 
analyses could potentially prove equally useful to those from other disciplines such as 
the political sciences, economics and ecology. 
 
However, the assertions made in this article have wider implications. If ‘macro’ legal 
analysis can play an important role in the way that we understand and develop GEG, 
there are major questions regarding the way that we train the lawyers who will become 
the discipline's architects and advisers. Arguably, the skills they require are not the 
same as the ‘micro’ level skills that practitioners need to develop.  
 
It can therefore be concluded that, at the masters and PhD levels at least, legal training 
should include a grounding in the wide range of legal disciplines that impact upon GEG, 
including an understanding of the roles of relevant international institutions as well as 
the different types of quasi-legal initiatives undertaken by non-state actors. Such 
training would not only sensitize aspiring scholars and policy advisers to many of the 
legal factors that are integral to determining environmental outcomes but would also 
provide them with a foundation to develop research in GEG, using a ‘macro’ legal 
analytical approach. 
 
Such an approach is not consistent with the orthodox methods that lawyers commonly 
adopt and therefore can seem to be either counter-intuitive or simply outside of the 
scope of the role that they should undertake. However, the challenges that GEG present 
to the international community are extraordinary ones that do not always respond to 
traditional methods of legal problems solving. Therefore, it is necessary for the legal 
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community to further the development of logical and evidence-based strategies. This 
may include adopting methods such as ‘macro’ legal analysis to carry out functions for 
which 'micro' legal analysis is less well suited. 
 
 
